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from the defendant in quantum meruit for their services in that connection. Defendant never entered New York personally, and he contended that the New York court had failed to obtain jurisdiction over
him because his Chicago attorneys were "independent contractors" and
not "agents"; therefore, their acts in New York could not be attributed
to him.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, but Justice Meyer
denied the motion without prejudice since the papers failed to indicate
whether or not the defendant had authorized the Chicago attorneys to
proceed in New York on the Illinois judgment. In the court's view, if
defendant had authorized the institution of the action on the Illinois
judgment in New York, then the retention of the plaintiffs by the
Chicago attorneys was an act by agents of the defendant. However, if
the Chicago attorneys had independently determined there was a need
to engage the plaintiffs, their actions were those of independent contractors which could not be deemed to be the acts of the defendant.
The defendant would be able to establish the nature of the Chicago
attorneys' acts in his answer when he again asserted that the New York
courts lacked jurisdiction over him.
Justice Meyer has dealt with the problem of the agent-independent contractor dilemma in an exemplary manner. However, it is
hoped that either an appellate authority or the legislature recognizes
the immediate need to reconsider Millnerand CPLR 302(a) in the light
of both Elman and Professor McLaughlin's position. Access to the New
York courts should not be denied to residents who perform purposeful
acts within the state on behalf of non-domiciliaries merely because of
technical distinctions which often prove meaningless for jurisdictional
purposes.
CPLR 308(4): Substituted service permitted upon plaintiff's own insurer as "real party in interest."
CPLR 308(1), (2) and (3) provide three methods by which service of
a summons upon a natural person shall be made. 43 CPLR 308(4), however, allows a court to substitute a fourth method of its own choosing
when service by one of the other three methods proves impracticable.
Of course, the alternate method which a court directs must meet due
process requirements.
43 By delivery to such person within the state; by delivery within the state to his
agent designated pursuant to CPLR 318; and by mailing the summons to such person's
last known address and ensuring that thU summons is also properly left at his place of
business, dwelling house or usual place of abode within the state. CPLR 308.

[VOL. 44

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

At one time it was mandatory that the means of service employed
be reasonably calculated to give a defendant actual notice of the proceedings.44 However, in Dobkin v. Chapman,45 the Court of Appeals
upheld a method which concededly did not provide actual notice. The
Court accepted the contention that a liability insurer (MVAIC) was the
"real party in interest"; substantial justice would therefore be served
by allowing service upon the insurer and substituted service by ordinary mail upon the defendant at his last known address even though
repeated attempts to give defendant actual notice of the proceedings
at that address had failed. The Court justified its position in part by
noting that there existed an opportunity for the defendant to reopen
the case under CPLR 317, and this would further serve to protect his
46
interests.
Dobkin was recently relied upon successfully in Pieretv. Murray,a
a case distinguished by a novel fact pattern. The plaintiff in Pieret was
injured when her car, driven by defendant, collided with an abutment.
When the defendant could not be served at his alleged address, plaintiff
applied for substituted service upon the defendant by ordinary mail in
conjunction with service upon her insurer. She contended that the
insurance carrier was the real party in interest in view of the fact that
the defendant-driver was an insured under her liability policy at the
time of the accident. In reality, therefore, the insurer would be ultimately liable for any judgment not in excess of the policy limits.
The situation presented thus differed from the one in Dobkin in
that there was but one car involved, and plaintiff was contending that
her own insurer was the real party in interest. The court found Dobkin
controlling however, and held that the method of service plaintiff
sought to employ would be permissible if she could sufficiently demonstrate that the other means of service provided by CPLR 308 were
impracticable."
44 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).

45 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968).
46 See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43
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(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1969).
48 The court required submission of the following information:
1. An affidavit by plaintiff setting forth in detail how long she knew defendant
prior to the accident, whether she knew where he ever lived or worked etc., 2. An
affidavit by the process server stating at what times and on what days service
was attempted on the defendant at 1500 Noble Avenue, Bronx, New York City.
Said affidavit should set forth the names and apartment numbers of the tenants
the process server claims he spoke to about defendant's living there and whether
he spoke to the superintendent of the building. 3. Copy of Police Blotter. 4. Copy
of envelope returned from Post Office to attorney for plaintiff containing the
notation thereon that defendant had "moved and left no address." 5. A statement
by plaintiff's attorneys as to what they did to obtain information arising out of the
disposition, if any, by the Criminal Court of the charge as to the issuance of
47 59 Misc. 2d 201, 298 N.Y.S.2d 201
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The decision appears to be well within the Dobkin rationale. In
both situations service is made upon a "token defendant" and an insurer who is the real party in interest in order to afford a presumably
worthy plaintiff a forum. Furthermore, the cases are in harmony with
49
the philosophy adopted by the Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth.
CPLR 311(1): "Acting" managing agent not managing agent for purpose of receiving service on behalf of corporation.
CPLR 311(l) substantially adopts and combines the provisions of
CPA 228(8) and (9) and CPA 229, 50 thus apparently ending the troublesome distinction between service on domestic and foreign corporations.' 1 However, practitioners are still faced with a problem that
existed under the CPA--when is defendant's employee a "managing
agent" for purposes of determining whether or not delivery of the
summons upon him will constitute personal service upon the corpora2
tion?5
While the statute is dear on its face,53 it is often difficult, if not
impossible, for a process server to determine if the recipient of the
summons is indeed what he purports to be- a managing agent in
fact.54 Moreover, managing agents are not always readily available to
the summons by the police to the defendant for operating an automobile without an operator's license, at the time of the accident. 6. A letter from the Dept. of
Motor Vehicles of the State of New York stating whether their records indicate
whether or not defendant has an operator's license and what address it has for
defendant.
59 Misc. 2d at 203-04, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04. Counsel involved in litigation over substituted service and a real party in interest should endeavor to accumulate this information and material in advance of any application to a court under CPLR 308(4).
49 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See generally Note, Seider
v. Roth: The ConstitutionalPhase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968).
60 1 WnNsrN, KoaN & MLLraR, NEv YoRK Cvii PRACarcE
311.01 (1968).
51 Compare Kiely v. Utica Gas 8- Elec. Co., 134 Misc. 258, 235 N.Y.S. 288 (County
Ct. Herkimer County 1929) with SEcoD REP,. at 161 n. 8.
62 At this juncture it should be noted that one authority has suggested that, prattically speaking, a lesser quantum of proof may be required to establish that someone is a
managing agent for a foreign corporation, in contrast to a domestic corporation, due to
the fact that there are less personnel to receive process on its behalf. 1 WmNsrmN, KoRN
& MILLER, Nmv YoRu CrvxL PRAcricE
311.05 (1968).
53 CPLR 311 provides, in part, that:
Personal service upon a corporation ...
shall be made by delivering the
summons as follows:
1. upon any domestic or foreign corporation, to an officer, director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant cashier....
54 In Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 136 N.Y. 343, 346, 32 N.E. 992, 993
(1893), the Court of Appeals defined a managing agent as
some person invested by the corporation with general powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as distinguished from an ordinary agent or
attorney, who acts in an inferior capacity and under the discretion and control
of superior authority, both in regard to the extent of his duty and the manner of
executing it.
But see Palmer v. Pennsylvania Co., 35 Hun. 369 (2d Dep't), affd, 99 N.Y. 679 (1885).
"Every object of the service is attained when the agent is of sufficient character and rank

